Coincidence (e.g., of a statue and the piece of bronze which constitutes it) comes in two varieties -permanent and temporary. Moderate monism (about coincidence) is the position that permanent coincidence, but not temporary coincidence, entails identity. Extreme monism (also known as the stage theory) is the position that even temporary coincidence entails identity. Pluralists are opponents of monism tout court.
2 I follow Hawthorne and Sider (2001) in my understanding of the notion of a temporal part. X is a temporal part of y at t if and only if x coincides with y at t and x exists only at t. Coincidence is explained in terms of overlap. One thing coincides with another at a time just in case the first overlaps everything that is a part of the second at the time (so it is big enough) and the second overlaps everything that is part of the first at the time (so it is not too big). One thing overlaps a second at a time iff they share a part at the time. One thing is a temporal part of another iff it is a temporal part of it at some time. So I am a temporal part of myself. And if a piece of bronze is accept for minimal perdurantism). Moreover, the moderate monist need not accept a plenitude of temporal parts in order to appeal to the Abelardian character of modal predicaton to resist the pluralist's argument from Leibniz's Law. The two are clearly separable (even though they are both embraced by Lewis) .
Moderate monist need not be perdurantists, then, unless everyone needs to be a perdurantist. Equally, perdurantists need not be moderate monists. A perdurantist can accept that, whenever I exist, there is something coincident with me that exists only at that time, without regarding me as a mere aggregate of such temporal parts. Or he can say that the temporal parts of the statue and the permanently coincident piece of bronze are distinct -in virtue perhaps of modal differences between them, so the statue-at-t5 and the piece-of-bronze-at-t5 are distinct instantaneous objects that (permanently) coincide. Insofar as the perdurantist wants to emphasise analogies between time and space he should not take this line, since it is like saying that when two houses share a wall there are actually two spatially coincident walls, but again my point is just that it is logically consistent to be a perdurantist (in the minimal sense) and simultaneously a pluralist.
II
The argument for moderate monism should not then be that it is a consequence of perdurantism, since it is not (quite apart from the fact that this argument would beg the question why perdurantism should be accepted). So what arguments are there for moderate monism?
Of course, moderate monism is a conjunctive thesis: that permanent coincidence is, but temporary coincidence is not, identity. So arguments for it have to rule out both the opposing positions, both pluralism and extreme monism. But in this section I will focus just on arguments against pluralism and defer discussion of extreme monism until later (though I have already indicated that I am in fact a good deal less unfriendly to it than to pluralism).
The fundamental anti-pluralist intuition is an intuition of supervenience: there cannot be two purely material objects which in all actual, relational and nonrelational, past, present and future respects are microphysically indistinguishable -as the statue and the piece of bronze are in the permanent coincidence situation if they are not identical. But this is precisely what the pluralist denies, so how can we get beyond the clash of intuitions?
I think that there are two main lines of argument against pluralism.
The first is as follows. While it may be disputable whether the statue and the piece of clay in the permanent coincidence situation -call them, as usual, Goliath and Lumpl -are distinct objects, no one could accept that they are distinct statues. The pluralist has to say that despite the properties it shares with Goliath, Lumpl is not a statue, and despite the properties it shares with Lumpl, Goliath is not a piece of bronze (alternatively the pluralist can say that though Goliath and Lumpl are both statues and distinct objects they are not distinct statues, but no pluralist will say that). So the pluralist has got to reject any proposition that entails that Lumpl is a statue (and any proposition that entails that Goliath is a piece of bronze).
But consider the following proposition (adapted from Johnston 1992, see also Noonan 1993 ; I follow Johnston's numbering):
(8) If y is a paradigm statue and x is microphysically exactly like y then x is a statue.
Suppose now, for reductio, that Goliath and Lumpl are distinct. Goliath is a paradigm statue, and Lumpl is microphysically indistinguishable from Goliath, so, given (8),
Lumpl is a statue. Hence there must be not merely two coincident material objects where Goliath is, but two coincident statues. But this is intolerable, hence, given (8), Goliath and Lumpl cannot be distinct.
Although Johnston thinks that this is an impressive argument against pluralism, he thinks that it can be resisted, since it can be seen that (8) is false. (8) is false because if it were true the following would also be true:
(9) If y is a paradigm statue and x is an entity that differs from y in any respect relevant to being a statue only very minutely, then x is a statue.
But that (9) is false, Johnston argues, can be seen by considering Peter Unger's (1981) 'problem of the many'.
The problem of the many begins from the observation that:
(10) In the closest vicinity of any paradigm middle-sized material F there are usually very many entities that differ only minimally from the paradigm in any respect.
Applying this principle to the case of Goliath/Lumpl, given (9) we must conclude that in the vicinity of Goliath there must be many statues, albeit highly coincident, almost completely overlapping. But this is false, hence, Johnston argues, the problem of the many reveals that (9) and hence (8) must be rejected.
Johnston thinks that what should replace (8) and (9) are: (8') If y is a paradigm statue and x is intrinsically exactly like y and x is of the right category, i.e. not a mere quantity or piece of matter, then x is a statue and:
(9') If y is a paradigm statue and x is an entity that differs from y in any respect relevant to being a statue only very minutely and x is of the right category, i.e. is not a mere quantity or piece of matter, then x is a statue.
I have doubts about whether these replacements provide a solution to the problem of the many, as Johnston thinks, but whether or not this is so, it is clear that the following alternative weakenings of (8) and (9) are not cast into doubt by that problem:
(8*) If y is a paradigm statue and x is microphysically exactly like y and x does not merely partly overlap any statue then x is a statue.
(9*) If y is a paradigm statue and x is an entity that differs from y in any respect relevant to being a statue only very minutely and x does not merely partly overlap any statue then x is a statue.
But if (8*) is true Lumpl is a statue just as Goliath is.
And, of course, if (8*) and (9*) are acceptable so are:
(8*') If y is a paradigm statue and x is microphysically exactly like y and x does not merely partly overlap any statue and x is of the right category, i.e., not a mere quantity or piece of matter, then x is a statue, and:
(9*') If y is a paradigm statue and x is an entity that differs from y in any respect relevant to being a statue only very minutely and x does not merely partly overlap any statue and x is of the right category, i.e., not a mere quantity or piece of matter, then x is a statue.
Of course, (8*') does not entail that Lumpl is a statue, but as we shall see later it can be used in conjunction with the second main argument against pluralism to push the pluralist to further extremes.
So the pluralist must reject (8*). How?
Well, one thing that the pluralist can say is that (8*), like (8), is false because something is a statue -an artwork -in virtue partly of its relational properties (Baker 1997 ). But it is obviously false that if x is an F in virtue partly of its relational properties and y is intrinsically microphysically like x and does not merely partly overlap x then y is an F. This is correct. (8*) and (8) are obviously false, as Johnston notes, since whether something is a statue depends on its causal origin, at least. But since it is part of the story that Goliath and Lumpl have the same origin and all the same relational properties (expressible in microphysical terms) there is no (non-question-begging) response here for the pluralist. The second way the pluralist can resist accepting (8*) is by insisting that sortal concepts are constituted by persistence conditions which give necessary conditions of falling under them and that, in the case of the concept of a statue, one such persistence condition is: being incapable of being radically changed in shape. So Lumpl is not a statue and (8*) is false because Lumpl is capable of being rolled into a ball and not destroyed and no statue is. Later I will be arguing that it is not necessary to assume that sortal concepts involve de re persistence conditions of this type in order to distinguish them from non-sortal concepts and what is acceptable in the thought that they do can be made consistent with moderate monism. But for now all I want to emphasise is that if it is said that Lumpl is a piece of bronze and not a statue because it is capable of being rolled into a ball without being destroyed it cannot also be said that it is capable of being rolled into a ball and not destroyed because it is piece of bronze and not a statue. The pluralist who appeals to modal differences to explain why Goliath and Lumpl are of different sorts cannot say that their modal differences are explicable in terms of their different sorts.
The final possibility for the pluralist who wishes to reject (8*) then is just to say that the sortal difference between Goliath and Lumpl is primitive. There is no other difference between them that explains why Goliath is a statue and Lumpl not, although there are other differences between them consequential on this difference, like the modal difference just noted, and other differences are possible because of this difference (it may be that the statue is admired and the piece of bronze not, that the statue is valuable and the piece of bronze not etc. (Fine 2003) At any rate, to reject the first argument against pluralism the pluralist must deny (8*) and to do so relevantly he must either accept that purely material entities of identical material constitution at all times can be distinct merely in virtue of differences in modal, dispositional or counterfactual properties or that purely material entities of identical material constitution at all times can be distinct merely in virtue of differences in sortal properties.
The second argument against pluralism that I find impressive is that it entails a degree of ontological inflation far greater than that made evident by the case of Goliath and Lumpl.
One way of arguing this is to consider the extensions of a compositionally vague general term on the assumption that vagueness has its source in language, not the world (see Noonan 1993 , drawing on Hughes 1986 ). But a simpler way to argue the point is to start with the thought that we employ a particular set of artefact concepts, but could have employed a slightly different set. Thus we talk, for example, of 'snowballs', where what is required for the persistence of a snowball is the persistence of a roughly spherical lump of snow. A snowball is destroyed once the lump is flattened into a disc shape.
Clearly, however, we could talk of 'snowdiscballs', where what is required for the persistence of a snowdiscball is less demanding; merely that the lump of snow remains either in a ball shape or a disc shape (see Sosa 1987) . The concept of a snowdiscball is as legitimate as the concept of a snowball and, in fact, in many cases where a snowball is present there will also be present an all-times-coincident snowdiscball (in every case, that is, in which the snowball is not made from a previously disc shaped piece of snow or destroyed by flattening it into a disc shape).
But to hold, in such a situation, that two, at-all-times-coincident, entities are present seems clearly absurd. It cannot be justified by insisting on the systematic reasons for distinguishing pieces of matter from the objects which constitute them, which Johnston gives as reasons for preferring his (8') and (9') to (8) and (9). 4 And, again, if we accept that in such a situation there are two coincident entities, we are bound to accept many more, for, once one gets the idea, it is very easy to invent other variations on the concept of a snowdiscball. So the point obviously generalizes to other artefact concepts and there seems no reason to reject its generalization to all concepts but an unacceptable anthropocentrism.
The position, then, is that if we insist on the standard, non-Abelardian, account of modal predication, which underpins the usual Leibniz's Law argument for pluralism, it will not be enough to allow that there is a systematic distinction between pieces of matter and the material objects they constitute; we will also have to accept that within the category of material objects constituted by pieces of matter it is possible for two distinct material objects to be at all times coincident, and in fact we will have to accept that not only can this be the case, but it is always the casewhenever we are prone to speak of there being one material object of a certain sort, there are, in fact, very many, always coincident, material objects of similar sorts distinguished only by their modal, dispositional or counterfactual properties.
Moreover, these entities will not merely be of similar sorts (snowballs and snowdiscballs) but of the same sort unless the doubly weakened version of (8), namely (8*') and its equivalents for other concepts are all relevantly false. I submit that accepting all this is too high a price to pay just to preserve the standard account of modal predication. Yet once we reject that account we no longer have any good room are permanently coincident. But the house could have been enlarged into (or originally built as) a many-roomed mansion, in which case the room would have become (or always have been) a proper part of it. So the pluralist must distinguish the two (see further the discussion of the paradox of increase below, or consider Lewis's example of GWR and GWR-(1986) or Kripke's example of the rootless plant and its stem in his unpublished lectures on identity). What the example of the snowdiscball brings out in addition is merely how huge the pluralist's ontological commitment is.
argument for non-identity even in the case of Goliath and Lumpl; we can, therefore, embrace monism without qualms.
The pluralist can respond (Mackie unpublished) that whilst this argument does establish that pluralism entails a degree of ontological inflation far greater than initial reflection on the case of Goliath and Lumpl might suggest, this is not unacceptably high, or at least, if it is the typical moderate monist, with his perdurantist commitment to plenitude, is in no position to say so. The only difference between the typical monist and the pluralist, in fact, is that whilst the moderate monist must accept the existence of snowdiscballs as well as snowballs just as the pluralist must, the latter must also accept, what the former will not, that there are snowdiscballs that are permanently coincident with distinct snowballs. This is a difference indeed, but why the pluralist can say, is it a significant one? Why, once the existence of snowdiscballs is conceded is it a significant gain in ontological economy to claim that when such entities are permanently coincident with snowballs they are identical with them?
I have no conclusive reply to this response. However, it is worth considering the consequence of accepting pluralism for the description of a possible world containing just one, spatially unextended, durationless atom (and it is hard to see why pluralists should consider such a thought experiment illegitimate). The moderate monist will say that this world contains just one material object. The pluralist must allow that it may contain a multitude, distinguished only by their sortal differences and modal differences. In fact, it is hard to see how the pluralist can avoid saying that such a world must contain infinitely many numerically distinct material objects. I leave it to the reader to decide whether this ontological commitment is not significantly more extensive than that of the plenitudinous perdurantist.
III
I turn now to the arguments against moderate monism and begin with Jim Stone's (2005a Stone's ( , 2005c (4) The statue does not survive radical reshaping.
But:
(5) Necessarily, any piece of bronze survives radical reshaping in which all its matter is preserved in one coherent whole (6) The matter of the piece of bronze is radically reshaped but preserved in one coherent whole.
So:
(7) The piece of bronze survives radical reshaping.
Therefore:
(8) The statue and the piece of bronze go their separate ways.
In this explanation (2) and (5) are de dicto modal propositions which tell us something about the persistence conditions, or identity criteria, of statues and pieces of bronze.
(1) and (6) The obvious worry about this explanation is that it does not do sufficient justice to the intuition that the SII statue does not survive reshaping because it cannot.
The principle appealed to, to justify the claim that the statue cannot survive radical reshaping, is the de dicto modal principle, (2), that no statue can survive radical reshaping, that is, that necessarily, if something is a statue it does not survive radical reshaping. But we can introduce the predicate 'permanent bachelor' with the obvious meaning and then there will be a de dicto modal principle analogous to (2) to the effect that no permanent bachelor can survive marriage. But it would be absurd to appeal to such a principle to explain why Dick, who, it turns out on his deathbed, was a permanent bachelor, never married when the opportunity presented itself.
Analogously, then, why is it not absurd to explain the divergence of the statue and the piece of bronze in Scenario II by appeal to the de dicto modal propositions (2) and
However, the explanation is straightforward. Scenario II is given to us by its description, as one in which a statue is coincident-up-to-t10 with a piece of bronze. Olson goes on to state this reasoning in a way that makes its premisses explicit and lays out a range of possible solutions. Thus stated the reasoning has eight steps:
(1) A acquires B as a part (8) A does not acquire B as a part (from (3) and (7)) -contradicting the original assumption (1).
One way of resisting this argument, of course, is to deny (7). This is what the moderate monist does, he says that before A acquires a new part it coincides with but is distinct from C, which ends up as a part of A. Olson responds:
But if A got bigger why didn't C get bigger too? … A but not C has the capacity to grow by gaining B as a part…. This is surprising. A and C appear to be exactly alike before the attachment…. There appears to be no difference that could account for any differing capacity to acquire parts…. We might try to explain it in terms of a difference in kind. 'enlarging a room'. Given that C is a room, therefore, there is no more mystery about why it is not extended though A is than about why Goliath is destroyed when the bronze is hammered shapeless.
The de dicto modal principles employed in these explanations can be thought of, as I have said, as specifying persistence conditions for things of the sorts in question, or again, they may be thought of as specifying criteria of identity for things of these sorts. Staying with the example of statues and pieces of bronze, we have seen two types of persistence conditions in the discussion above.
The principle that no statue can undergo radical reshaping can be expressed as follows (S) Necessarily, for all x, if x is a statue then if the matter that constitutes x at t is radically reshaped at t, then x ceases to exist -this specifies a 'passing away' condition for statues.
The principle that any piece of bronze must survive radical reshaping in which all its matter is preserved in one coherent whole can be expressed as:
(P) Necessarily, for all x, if x is a piece of bronze then if the matter that constitutes x at t is radically reshaped at t but preserved in one coherent mass, x survives Mackie (unpublished b)).
Both 'passing away' and 'preservation conditions' can, however, be thought of as consequences of conditions of a more fundamental kind. The reason why sortal concepts are governed by such conditions is that they constrain the histories of the things they apply to, and such constraints can always be expressed in the form:
Necessarily, if x is an S then if x exists at t and t' then Rxtt'.
Or of the form:
Necessarily, if x is an S then if Rxtt' x exists at t and t'.
Thus the 'passing-away' condition for statues is entailed by a principle of the first form (stating that a statue cannot have radically different shapes at different times) and the 'preservation condition' for pieces of bronze is entailed by a principle of the second form (stating that if the matter composing a piece of bronze is in one coherent mass at both of two times, whatever shape it is in, the piece of bronze exists at both times).
Principles of these forms lay down necessary conditions for being a thing of sort S and a specification of the totality of such conditions is a specification of the persistence conditions, or the criterion of diachronic identity, for things of that sort.
What distinguishes sortal concepts from non-sortal concepts (even ones that necessarily apply to a thing at any time it exists, like being a permanent bachelor) is that they are governed by such de dicto modal principles. To see that this is an adequate rephrasing of the problem one need only observe that a condition is sufficient just in case nothing else is necessary. So a complete list of necessary conditions, together with the fact that the list is complete determines all the sufficient conditions. But a quaternary relation R, satisfied by ordered quadruples <x, t, y, t'> is sufficient for the identity of statue x at time t with statue y at time t' just in case there is no such relation R', not entailed by R, which is a necessary condition of statue identity over time (where to say that R' is a necessary condition of statue identity over time is just to say, as we have seen, that if x is a statue and x exists at t and t* then R'xtxt*).
Question ( This can be approached by noting that if the response to Stone and Olson given above is accepted it must be taken on board that whether a sortal concept One way the moderate monist can respond to all this is by querying the claim that sortal concepts are not future-reflecting. He can agree that I do not need foresight to know that there is a statue before me, and that I can know of what is before me that it coincides with a statue without knowing its future -and so he can agree that in these respects the concept of a statue is unlike the concept of a future Presidentwhilst insisting that in the strict sense Mackie's argument requires not to be the case, sortal concepts are future-reflecting. But I think it is more straightforward for the moderate monist to allow that sortal concepts are not future-reflecting, even in the strict sense.
What follows?
First, it follows that whether we are in the permanent-coincidence or temporary-coincidence scenario, Lumpl is a statue before t10. So in the temporarycoincidence scenario there are two objects present before t10 each of which is a statue then. Are there two statues there? Not unless we count by identity. So the moderate monist can simply deny that we do. In other words the moderate monist can simply take a leaf out of the relative identity theorist's book. 6 Entities are to be counted as two statues, he can say, when both are statues and are not the same statue. But though when coincident Goliath and Lumpl are both statues they are then the same statue, so they are to be counted as one statue. They are the same statue because the relation we express in English with the form of words 'is the same statue as at time t' is a relative equivalence relation, not an absolute equivalence relation.
and graft on a tail -in other words a same-origin-temporary-coincidence case of the same type as the Goliath/Lumpl example, or Olson's example of (house) A and (room) C. Now the opponent of relative identity faces a hard set of choices. He can deny that both Tib and Tibbles exist before the grafting. Or he can accept that the concept of a cat is future-reflecting. Or he can join the pluralist in denying that there need be any actual microphysical difference, relational or non-relational, past, present or future between a cat and something which is not a cat -which takes us back over old ground.
It is not surprising then that the moderate monist's position, when developed in the most straightforward way to meet Mackie's objection, leads to an acceptance of relative identity. At this point the moderate monist must take another leaf out of the relative identity theorist's book, and distinguish between restricted sortal quantification and unrestricted quantification over things falling under a sortal concept. The de dicto persistence conditions governing the concept of a statue define a sortal kind to which Goliath but not Lumpl belongs (in the temporary coincidence scenario; in the permanent coincidence scenario both belong to it because 'they' are the same object).
It is this sort we quantify over when we use the quantifying expressions 'some statue'
and 'every statue' (mutatis mutandis, 'some piece of bronze' and 'every piece of bronze'). And it is these quantifying expressions that figure in the appropriate Russellian expansion of the definite descriptions mentioned above. So the description 'the statue in such and such a place at t5' uniquely denotes Goliath even though
Lumpl is there and is also, before t10 a statue.
As I said, the distinction between restricted sortal quantification and unrestricted quantification over things falling under a sortal concept, is a familiar part of the relative identity theorist's package, but in a moment I want to show how it naturally emerges in another framework, namely, that of the stage-theorist. Before coming to that, however, I want first to explain how it is a necessary part of the moderate monist's position even if relative identity is rejected.
Return to the permanent coincidence scenario. another. This, Lewis claims, is an argument for perdurantism. But if so, the stage theorist claims, it is an even better argument for stage theory, since he can capture, as the perdurantist cannot, the intuition that the thing that is bent simpliciter is a statue.
The stage theorist will therefore be happy to say that at every moment before t10 in the temporary coincidence scenario the piece of bronze is a statue and the statue is a piece of bronze, since every one of the coincident stages before t10 is both a statue and a piece of bronze.
One problem for the stage theorist is to explain why I have only ever owned three cats, given that I have owned an infinite number of cat stages (of course, he also faces the problem of explaining why I have owned more than one cat given that 'I' denotes a present instantaneous stage, but, as is familiar, he solves this problem by appeal to an Abelardian temporal counterpart theory). One plausible line suggested by Hawley's discussion (2001:62) is to say that when counting cats we do not count by numerical identity, but by the cat unity relation, i.e., that relation which holds between two cat stages (cats) when, as the perdurantist would say, they are stages of the same cat. But since cat stages are cats, it is plausible to suppose that we count them as the same only when they are the same cat; in which case we must take it that 'is the same cat as' denotes, not numerical identity, but the cat unity relation (which, however, holds between simultaneous cat stages only when they are numerically identicalsetting aside time-travelling cats). Another way of responding to the problem of counting across time, suggested by Sider's discussion (2001:197) , is to say that sometimes, when we quantify over cats, we quantify not over cat stages (though they are cats), but over maximal summations of cat stages related pairwise by the cat unity relation. Understanding my assertion that I have only ever owned three cats in terms of such quantification gets the truth-conditions right.
It is reasonable, I think, to say that we should not regard these suggestions by to recognise that 'is the same cat as' denotes the unity relation for cats, rather than numerical identity, in order to avoid the implausibility of saying that though you have only ever owned one cat, you have owned infinitely many things, each of which was a cat and no two of which were the same cat.
At any rate, it is easy to see how the moderate monist can employ the stage theorist's ideas, modified in the way suggested, if he accepts the plenitudinous ontology common to the perdurantist and stage theorist. His account will still be distinct from that of the extreme monist (we can describe it as moderately extreme monism), since, though he will recognise a strict identity at any moment before t10 in the temporary coincidence scenario between something which is correctly describable as a statue and something which is correctly describable as a piece of bronze, he will be able to deny that the statue is identical with the piece of bronze. And, of course, the arguments against pluralism and the responses to the objections to moderate monism put forward by Stone, Olson and Mackie will remain in force.
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